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Problems and questions originally raised by Robert Nozick in his famous thought experiment 
„The Experience Machine‟ are frequently invoked in the current discourse concerning virtual 
worlds. Having conceptualized his Gedankenexperiment in the early seventies, Nozick could not 
fully anticipate the numerous and profound ways in which the diffusion of computer simulations 
and video games came to affect the Western world. 
 
This article does not articulate whether or not the virtual worlds of video games, digital 
simulations, and virtual technologies currently actualize (or will actualize) Nozick‟s thought 
experiment.  Instead, it proposes a philosophical reflection that focuses on human experiences in 
the upcoming age of their „technical reproducibility‟.  
 
In pursuing that objective, this article integrates and supplements some of the interrogatives 
proposed in Robert Nozick‟s thought experiment. More specifically, through the lenses of 
existentialism and philosophy of technology, this article tackles the technical and cultural 
heritage of virtual reality, and unpacks its potential to function as a tool for self-discovery and 
self-construction. Ultimately, it provides an interpretation of virtual technologies as novel 
existential domains. Virtual worlds will not be understood as the contexts where human beings 
can find completion and satisfaction, but rather as instruments that enable us to embrace 







„The Experience Machine‟ is a thought experiment that was proposed in the 1970s by American 
philosopher Robert Nozick. In it, Nozick hypothesized the existence of a device capable of 
disclosing interactive virtual experiences. The experiences upheld by his fictional machine are 
envisaged to be not only persistent, but also indistinguishable from those that we, as humans, can 
develop in relation with the actual world. In this outline of Nozick‟s thought experiment, I am 
using the descriptor „actual‟ to indicate the analog contexts that we inhabit and share as (and 
with) biological creatures.  
 
Nozick‟s thought experiment challenged us to envision having access to a device that could 
indefinitely supplant our everyday experiences with virtual ones designed to maximize our 
pleasure and satisfaction. By presenting us with the possibility of an experience machine, he 
invited reflections on whether the way we live our lives is solely driven by the pleasure principle, 
or if there is something else that we value other than how we feel „from the inside‟. If such a 
machine existed, asked the American philosopher, “would you plug in?” (Nozick, 1974, 42) 
 
Nozick‟s mental exercise has been differently invoked and interpreted in various contexts. Some 
authors have understood „The Experience Machine‟ as implicitly giving rise to arguments against 
utilitarianism; others have interpreted it as opposing hedonistic positions in both ethics and 
psychology (Sober and Wilson, 1998; Feldman, 2010). More recently, Robert Nozick‟s 
Gedankenexperiment has been examined in fields of inquiry such as media studies and 
philosophy of technology (Lin, 2016; Silcox, 2017). Stimulated by developments in virtual 
technologies, some of the questions originally raised by „The Experience Machine‟ are presently 
used in those disciplines as springboards for reflecting on the qualities and on the effects of our 
interactive experiences in (and of) virtual worlds.  
 
Having conceptualized his thought experiment in the early seventies, Nozick could not have fully 
anticipated the numerous and profound ways in which the diffusion of computer simulations and 
video games came to affect the Western world. Besides, his imaginative exercise was meant to 
kindle questions concerning our ethical compass, not existential and phenomenological 
quandaries ensuing from experiencing interactive, artificial worlds. In the Western world, social 
activities like the crafting of- and the access to- virtual worlds are increasingly more affordable 
and already deeply integrated in social practices (Gualeni, 2015b). Moreover, devices that recall 
those outlined in „The Experience Machine‟ appear to be already at the outer edges of our 
technological reach. It is hence obvious to me that today – more than forty years after the 
original formulation of Nozick‟s thought experiment – it would be paradoxical to think about 
those machines as if they were still imaginary, inscrutable gizmos, rather than the concrete 
aspiration of consumer-technology companies. In this context – a context in which the virtual 
worlds of video games are already established as a prominent form of cultural mediation and 
meaning-making – this article will supplement Nozick‟s reflections and to further elaborate on 
his thought experiment through the lenses of existentialism, and philosophy of technology.  
 
 
2 A MACHINE FOR EXPERIENCING 
 
In his 1962 essay „The Myth of Total Cinema‟, French film critic and theorist André Bazin 
interpreted the specific ways in which cinema reproduced images, sounds, and motion as the 
first, rudimentary steps towards building a machine that is capable of experientially recreating 
the world. From his point of view, the technical advancements of cinema – when not merely 
directed towards the pursuit of capitalistic gain – constitute an evolutionary process aimed at 
crafting progressively more accurate and sensorily complete artificial experiences. For Bazin, the 
myth guiding the evolution of cinema consisted of the aspiration to achieve those same 
experiential effects that Nozick later attributed to his fictional machine. He believed that cinema 
ultimately aspires to be the “[…] recreation of the world in its own image, an image unburdened 
by the freedom of interpretation of the artist or the irreversibility of time.” (Bazin, 1967, 21)  
 
Pursuing academic research at the intersection of film studies and game studies, Mark J. P. Wolf 
noted that the ambitions expressed in „The Myth of Total Cinema‟ and its underlying ideology 
are very much alive and well today, and are clearly materialized in the imaginary future of 
virtual worlds. As recent examples of cinematic incarnations of the „myth‟, Wolf mentioned the 
movies Total Recall (1990), eXistenZ (1999), and The Matrix series (1999 and 2003), in whose 
fictional scenarios experience machines exist and have various societal applications, from 
entertainment to the subjugation of humanity. In other words, these are movies in whose fictional 
contexts the myth of total cinema had been technically achieved in its complete immersivity and 
indistinguishability from lived experience (ibid.).   
 
In the current age of digital mediation, the disclosure of a convincing „illusion of a world‟ can be 
similarly identified as one of the most evident aspirations guiding the advancements of virtual 
reality and video game technologies (Gualeni, 2015a, 45, 46). Wolf accordingly proposed, in his 
2015 essay „Video games, cinema, Bazin, and the myth of simulated lived experience‟, to 
recognize video games as expressive forms through which the myth of total cinema and its 
ambitions are still pursued in contemporary Western cultures (Wolf, 2015). This way of 
approaching video games is in fact not only consonant with what Bazin described in „The Myth 
of Total Cinema‟, but – as will become clearer later in this essay – can also be recognized as the 
ideological foundation to the ways in which we design, criticize, and attribute cultural values to 
video games and, more generally, to virtual worlds. 
 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the German philosopher Ernst Kapp proposed an 
understanding of technology according to which human beings develop and use artifacts with the 
fundamental purpose of overcoming the limitations and the insufficiencies of their native 
organism. In his vision, technologies are (conscious or even unconscious) artificial 
supplementations of certain functions that are originally accomplished by human organs (Kapp, 
1877). Kapp‟s functional understanding of technology is not limited to the use of various tools to 
enhance our capabilities to perceive, transport, communicate, and interact with the world. He 
also recognized our artificial extensions as cognitive instruments (Gualeni, 2015a; Gualeni, 
2015b, 68). The invention of the mechanical clock is an example that is frequently used to 
illustrate this point; that is to say, to demonstrate how our technologies (and our interconnected 
technological systems) influence and shape our thought in ways that are subtle, pervasive, and 
that transcend the practical functions for which those artifacts were originally designed. 
American historian Lewis Mumford, for example, famously viewed the mechanical clock as the 
defining machine of the industrial age. Unlike most of his contemporaries, who identified in the 
steam engine the key creation that propelled us into industrialism, Mumford realized that it was 
the clock, on account of its effectively „producing‟ a regular and parcelized understanding of 
time, that paved the way for all the technical and social developments of that period (Mumford, 
1934, 14, 15). Similarly, Dutch historian Edward Jan Dijksterhuis maintained that, in the early 
Modern period, the precise and ingenious mechanism of clocks persuaded physicists that nature 
itself worked like clockwork, inspiring the development of classical mechanics (Dijksterhuis, 
1986, 442f).  
 
In the 1980‟s, and in line with the understanding of the cultural effects of artifacts encapsulated 
in the examples above, American media theorist Neil Postman argued that we should avoid 
approaching our technical tools and media as if they were neutral instruments, as they never 
purely accomplish instrumental tasks. Rather, our technical creations also always function as 
mediators, and in their mediating roles, they inevitably “classify the world for us, sequence it, 
frame it, enlarge it, reduce it, colour it, argue a case for what the world is like” (Postman, 2005, 
10). Several philosophers of technology who have adopted a general interpretation of 
technological tools as mediators understand technical systems as dynamic realms for self-
discovery and self-transformation (Verbeek; 2011; Gualeni, 2015b; Zarkadakis, 2015; Gualeni, 
2015c). As well as any other technologies, virtual worlds could (and perhaps should) be 
recognized as systems that allow us to materialize our worldviews and ideas, as ways to make 
our beliefs and aspirations into objects of critical (and self-critical) evaluation. 
 
This aspect of our relationship with technologies becomes, I find, particularly interesting when it 
comes to acknowledging the fact that virtual experiences and digital worlds are (still) 
encountered through devices, i.e. through interfaces and technological artifacts. From this 
perspective, we can approach Nozick‟s „The Experience Machine‟ not only as a thought 
experiment meant to problematize ethical hedonism or utilitarianism, but also as a way to 
encourage and facilitate reflections on the ethical quandaries ensuing from creating and utilizing 
technologies that disclose virtual experiences. To clarify this point and its relevance, I will 
discuss a few practical examples, which will reference the movies discussed in the previous 
section of this essay. 
 
In both Total Recall and eXistenZ, the protagonists physically encounter a machine that is 
capable of disclosing persistent virtual worlds in ways that are indistinguishable from their 
everyday experiences. Albeit skeptically, and for different reasons, both Quaid (in Total Recall) 
and Pikul (in eXistenZ) willingly make the decision to plug into each respective version of the 
experience machine and plunge into illusory worlds that are supposed to be pleasurable. 
 
The case of Neo (the protagonist of The Matrix trilogy) is, I believe, significantly different as far 
as the objectives of this essay are concerned. At the beginning of the first movie of the series, 
Neo is unaware that he is plugged into a technological system that „feeds‟ his brain the 
experiences of an artificial world. Since he had been conscious, Neo‟s world had always been a 
product of an experience machine, a machine that he never agreed to be plugged into and that he 
never encountered as an object of experience (at least he did not at that point in the movie). In a 
large portion of the first instalment of The Matrix, Neo cannot thus develop a complete ethical 
and ontological understanding of his condition, let alone articulate a critical stance towards the 
artificiality of the virtual world in which he is immersed. 
 
The cited movies can be understood as presenting two different situations: one in which plugging 
into the machine is based on a consciously chosen relationship with a technological artifact, and 
one in which that is not the case. It is my conviction that the recent philosophical discussions 
stimulated by Nozick‟s thought experiment concerning our relationships with virtual worlds are 
largely a product of how „The Experience Machine‟ presents a scenario that – paradoxically – 
encompasses both the situations described above. Allow me to elaborate on this point by 
resorting to extracts taken directly from „The Experience Machine‟: 
 
 On the one hand, Nozick clarifies that his fictional machine offers the possibility to 
“[…] pick and choose from their vast library or smorgasbord of such experiences, 
selecting your life‟s experiences for, say, the next two years. After two years have 
passed, you will have ten minutes or ten hours out of the tank, to select the 
experiences of your next two years.” (Nozick, 1974, 42) Concordantly, to operate the 
machine and – crucially – in order to make the decision of whether to plug in or not, 
its users must first encounter the experience machine as an object. There must be, put 
in a somewhat simpler way, occasions before plugging into the machine and between 
experiential sessions when the machine is present to them as a mediating device, as 
the physical „gateway‟ to certain possibilities of experiencing and being. 
 
 On the other hand, the machine does not only need to provide an illusion of a world 
that is smooth, consistent, and experientially complete, but – for the 
Gedankenexperiment to work – the users need to have no recollection of the 
experiences and choices leading to plugging into (or plugging back into) the machine. 
As Nozick puts it, “while you are in the tank you won‟t know you‟re there; you‟ll 
think it‟s actually happening.” (ibid.) 
 
The hypothetical setup of „The Experience Machine‟ as a thought experiment thus requires our 
making volitional choices in relation to a physical device. At the same time, for the fictional 
device to produce the envisaged experiential effects, the choices and the awareness mentioned in 
the previous passage must be removed from the users‟ consciousness as soon as they plug into an 
experience machine. What I want to suggest here is that if users could remember the various 
steps and choices leading to their plugging-in, they could not avoid filtering (at least initially) 
their virtual experiences through the awareness that the world that they are experiencing is in fact 
a synthetic artifact. 
 
Further complications arise in hypothetical scenarios like those of unplugging from the 
experience machine or in the case of an interruption of the streaming of artificial experiences 
(regardless of its accidental or scheduled nature). In those circumstances, memories and choices 
of our lives from before plugging-in will need to be recuperated and reactivated. Why? If not to 
avoid psychological damage upon returning to the actual world, that awareness will at any rate 
be indispensable for taking significant existential decisions such as whether to plug back in or 
what future developments to choose for the continuation of our life in that virtual world (as 
envisioned by Nozick himself). 
 
On the basis of Nozick‟s core hypothesis, that is to say the possibility for technology to have a 
totalizing and deterministic effect over human experience, I approached „The Experience 
Machine‟ specifically from perspectives borrowed from philosophy of technology. This lead to 
the surfacing of a paradox at the core of Nozick‟s thought experiment: a situation of 
irreconcilable ambiguity in which human beings are expected to be at the same time selectively 
aware and unaware of the mediating role of a virtual reality device in relation to their experience.  
To be sure, this logical impasse can be sidestepped quite easily, albeit perhaps inelegantly, by 
hypothesizing yet another device: an apparatus capable of compartmentalizing our awareness 
and selectively activating areas of it. With this additional conjectural device, we would be able to 
target and inhibit memories of our relationship with the experience machine, enabling us to 
forget having programmed one or having decided to plug into one. For the sake of simplicity, I 
will call this additional, fictitious apparatus the „memory suppressor‟. 
 
Did Nozick implicitly think that a memory suppressor would be part of an experience machine? 
Let us suppose, as a first conjectural scenario, that he did not. If that were the case, and for the 
reasons articulated above, the immersion provided by plugging into his fictional device could not 
be expected to have a totalizing effect. Once plugged into the experience machine, in fact, people 
could not avoid remaining conscious of the synthetic constitution of the virtual worlds that they 
were experiencing. As a consequence, the relationships that can be established with those worlds 
could not (or at least could not initially) smoothly and convincingly hijack those of the world that 




In this first hypothetical scenario, in which a „memory suppressor‟ is not a technical component 
of an experience machine, my expectation is that, in a way that is not dissimilar from fictional 
content of existing media, the users allow themselves to temporarily suspend their disbelief and 
to be – to different degrees – „immersed‟ in virtual worlds (Murray, 1997). They will, however, 
inevitably remain aware of the artificiality of that experience and conscious of the existence of a 
world outside of the simulation. For this reason, I can argue that the machine imagined by 
Nozick could not supplant our relationship with the world wholesale without a memory 
suppressor. In this first situation, I expect that users would relate to Nozick‟s device in a way that 
is similar to how they currently engage with video game consoles or virtual reality gear. By that I 
mean that they would intuitively consider the experience disclosed by the machine as that of a 
derivative world meant for entertainment, relaxation, education, training, and so on. Conceived 
of as such, I envisage that people would choose to plug into an experience machine with the 
expectation of pleasure, or self-betterment through play, or communication, discovery, and 




I consider this first, tentative answer to be quite dull. It is, to begin with, largely speculative and 
rooted in personal experiences and feelings. On top of that, it does not take into consideration 
determinants such as personal inclinations, states such as those of depression and low self-
esteem, physical and emotional loss, as well as any other form of psychological trauma that 
might encourage individuals to seek preferential meaning-making and extended relief in virtual 
                                                          
1
 Imagining myself in that situation – which would be analogical to a scenario that Greg Egan outlines in his novel 
Permutation City, – I believe that the awareness of the artificiality of the virtual worlds one finds oneself immersed 
into would be in itself almost unbearable from a psychological point of view (Egan, 2008, 3). It would be a state of 
mind similar to a paranoid fixation which is, however, unlikely to be a permanent one. Such attitude towards the 
world would be – Egan argues – “too bizarre to be sustained for long.” (ibid.) 
 
2
 Mentioning several positive social uses for the experience machine in this paragraph, I am not intending to claim 
that the experience machine would only be used in those manners and with those intentions. In line with a long 
tradition of dystopian social science fiction, we can easily imagine the machine being put to negative social uses - 
for punishment and correction rather than for the pursuit of a liberal education; for psychological and physical 
torture rather than for pleasure. 
worlds. The greatest deficiency that I can find in this answer to Nozick‟s hypothetical questions 
is, however, its negligible philosophical significance. The appeal and the immersive effects of 
virtual worlds of the kind just described can already be experienced, to a certain degree of 
aesthetical fidelity, with current virtual technologies, and could already be suitably explored with 
the tools and methods of empirical science. In other words, if the experience machine did not 
feature a way to selectively inhibit our awareness of the machine itself, it stands to reason that 
Nozick‟s interrogatives are more efficiently tackled by fields such as cognitive psychology or 
game user research. 
 
Abandoning this first hypothetical scenario, the upcoming section will embark on the more 
challenging and, I believe, more philosophically fruitful question of whether one would plug  




3  A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT WITHIN A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 
 
Reading Anarchy, State, and Utopia (the book containing „The Experience Machine‟), it is not 
entirely clear what broader ethical and philosophical objectives Nozick was pursuing with his 
famous Gedankenexperiment. What is, instead, obvious in his text is the fact that he considered 
that most people would not opt for plugging into an experience machine in a permanent or semi-
permanent fashion (Nozick, 1974, 44). According to Nozick, there are other things that matter to 
people in addition to pleasure, and in his book he supported this belief by appealing to three 
motivations. Out of the three of them, I consider the third to be the most interesting and 
provocative. In his third motivation, and in line with what was discussed in the previous section 
of this essay, Nozick predicted that many people would refuse the offer of a permanent 
connection with an experience machine on the basis of it being nothing more than a human 
artifact. We would be resistant, he claimed, to abandon the world that we index as „actual‟ for a 
virtual one that is neither more unfathomable nor more meaningful (ibid., 43). 
 
Even if we were somehow technically capable of inhibiting the awareness that we were 
connected to an experience machine after having plugged into one, the conscious decision of 
plugging-in permanently (or semi-permanently) would still need to be taken by each individual 
user with the awareness that the machine is in fact a machine, and that the worlds that such 
machine discloses can neither be as complex nor as existentially significant as the actual one. I 
will now try to argue and explain in more detail why I believe that would be the case. 
 
In the previous section of this essay, virtual worlds were recognized as derivative products that 
are inevitably conceptualized and built around specific (and specifically human) ways to 
perceive and understand what the actual world is and how it functions. To clarify this last point 
in particular, I would like to propose an imaginative exercise of my own. I encourage readers to 
imagine having at their disposal a specific kind of experience machine. This hypothetical device 
would generate and uphold „single player‟ virtual worlds that are experientially indistinguishable 
from the one that we index as „actual‟, and would allow its user to design his or her existential 
course in a way that has an impact on the rest of the virtual world. The „single-player‟ descriptor 
serves here to clarify that the phenomena, events, and relationships that constitute those virtual 
worlds are uniquely experienced by the one user who is plugged into a specific machine, and are 
not shared with other users plugged into similar devices
3
. The solipsistic machine described 
above would specifically allow its users to design their existence and experience anything they 
desire. It would also feature a memory suppressor that would automatically activate after a user 
plugged in.  
 
Now, I ask each reader to imagine that, as an individual user, he or she decides to program such a 
machine to fulfil the dream of becoming a prominent scientist, say an experimental physicist. 
This objective would include experiencing years of strenuous experimental research work, facing 
self-doubt and the resistance of peers, and finally rising to international (simulated) fame. The 
premises for this thought experiment are designed to elicit feelings that I expect most people 
would find pleasurable. Witnessing one‟s efforts leading to positive outcomes, overcoming 
obstacles, and being admired for one‟s skills and contributions is likely not only to be inherently 
pleasurable, but also meaningful, in the existential acceptation of the term (that is, resorting to 
the consciousness of other people to complement and fulfil a personal sense of meaning and self-
worth).  
 
Let us take a step backwards for a moment, and let us suppose that the user that is about to plug 
into one of these hypothetical devices is informed that the machine can only disclose „single-
player‟ virtual worlds, worlds that are – furthermore – strictly reliant on the current 
understandings of physics. This entails that the simulation of physical phenomena that are 
possible in the machine cannot be deeper or more granular than those that we managed to study 
and understand in relation to the actual world
4
. What I mean to say is that our capability to 
understand and experiment with physics in virtual worlds (and even to virtually manipulate and 
subvert it) is inevitably bound by the conceptual and experimental approaches to physics that are 
available to us as the creators of the experience machine. The very software and hardware 
components of the speculative machine in question can only be designed within those conceptual 
frameworks and on the basis of certain understandings of physics that were originally developed 
in relation to the actual world. 
 
As a consequence of the machine‟s limitations, it should be clear to the reader that, as far as 
experimental science is concerned: 
 
                                                          
3
 I believe it is important to clarify that in his thought experiment, Nozick does not explicitly state that his 
hypothetical machine exclusively discloses single-user experiences. The reason why I believe that is the case 
anyway is that the machine could not uphold a consistent, believable world in which two or more users wanted to 
experience things that were in conflict with one another or contradicted one another. The question remains open, 
however, concerning whether the machine could allow us to passively spectate somebody else‟s virtual experiences 
(as a disembodied observer), or temporarily participate in it with limited agency (for example impersonating virtual 
insects or simulated, ghostly beings).  
 
4
 To be sure, this is not to say that simulated physics can be at best identical to actual physics; many video game 
worlds offer virtual worlds that playfully subvert physical properties and behaviours that we are familiar and 
scientifically well-acquainted with in the actual world. It could suffice, for example, to think of the possibility 
granted in the world of Portal (Valve, 2007) to create wormholes in tri-dimensional spaces (portals that allow space 
to be short-circuited), or the ways in which the concepts of time and causation are manipulated and subverted in 
video games such as Blinx: The Time Sweeper (Artoon, 2002), Prince of Persia: Sands of Time (UbiSoft Montreal, 
2003), or Braid (Number None, Inc., 2008). 
1) no phenomena or interactions beyond what we already know about physics will 
actually be observable (or even possible) when plugged-in. The experimental 
discoveries that the users will be responsible for in their simulated roles of prominent 
physicists will thus be fictitious, and could not be directly relevant to any actual 
scientific advancements;  
 
2) no other conscious human being will witness or appreciate any of the work and 
achievements that the user will produce inside the virtual world, and even if anybody 
did, the value of those experiences and findings would be interesting only anecdotally 
or for research into the human psyche and behaviour (thus, producing new knowledge 
through virtual worlds and not in virtual worlds). For the reasons explained in point 1, 
no new particles or behaviors can actually be discovered in virtual worlds and no 
paradigm-shifting experiments can be actually run within them.      
 
Having received this information, would one still decide to plug in and experience that 
existence? Would one not, instead, find it more meaningful to dedicate the time span of his or 
her biological life to somehow participating in the actual progress of humanity, for example by 
contributing to the actual growth of scientific knowledge, rather than in its virtual simulacrum? 
What I am trying to emphasize here is not that experimental science is the only way (or a 
particularly desirable way) to develop knowledge, but rather that the experiences upheld by the 
experience machine are inherently derivative. To be sure, I do not believe in the categorical 
impossibility for acquiring knowledge (or for triggering personal transformations) from 
simulated events and experiences. It is evident to me that there are many ways in which 
observing the lives of people plugged into experience machines could further our understanding 
of who we are as human beings. In fact, if we could look into someone else‟s simulated 
experience (see footnote 3), and if that person granted us permission to observe and study his or 
her simulated experiences and record data about them (or we somehow obtained the legal and 
ethical clearance to do so, in the case – for example – of people in a coma or non-human users), 
then we could definitely derive meaningful insights from them. For example, we could: 
  
 detect and study psychological and behavioral patterns of its users (human or non-human) 
in a number of different contexts and situations, 
 design virtual worlds so that their inhabitants could unwittingly perform citizen-science 
actions involving the analysis of actual data (similarly to current projects such as Foldit
5
 
or Play to Cure: Genes in Space
6
), 
 stimulate and test new heuristic approaches and generate new hypotheses in a variety of 
epistemic fields, including self-discovery and self-construction, 
                                                          
5
 Originally released in 2008, Foldit is a cross-platform online puzzle videogame that allows the players to simulate 
control of some of the biochemical processes involved in protein folding. It was developed by the University of 
Washington's Center for Game Science in collaboration with the UW Department of Biochemistry. The analysis of 
players‟ creative solutions to protein folding puzzles in Foldit allowed scientists to develop cures to diseases and 
pursue innovation in biotechnology (Eiben et Al., 2012). 
 
6
 Play to Cure: Genes in Space is a 2014 free, mobile video game through which players, flying a spaceship through 
hurdles and resources in space, help researchers analyze real genetic data used in cancer research. Play to Cure: 
Genes in Space is an ongoing project that was developed under the guidance of Cancer Research UK. 
 
 simulate and test new forms of social and economic organization.  
 
Having outlined the experimental scientist scenario, would people consciously choose that path? 
I expect that the answer would be negative, as I am convinced that most of us would still be 
resistant to limiting our emotions, our social engagement, our professional efforts, and our 
personal aspirations (regardless of their merits) to artificial worlds. Nozick must have had the 







Sidestepping Nozick‟s questions, in this conclusion I would like to clarify that I did not mean to 
imply (in this essay or elsewhere) that the actual world will ultimately satisfy us, or that our 
expectations and aspirations will find an adequate response in our experiential relationship to it. 
If the romantic age had not offered enough examples as to why that might not be the case, 
Ancient Greek tragedies and the artistic and philosophical currents of Existentialism and 
Absurdism could also be mentioned as historical landmarks of Western culture‟s awareness of 
the meaninglessness of our existential struggle in this world.  
 
As a corollary to the arguments and perspectives developed in this essay, I would like to propose 
the idea that all worlds are ultimately absurd, and that technologies can never be expected to 
offer definitive solutions to the boring, painful, and even tragic dimensions of our existence. 
They are, I argue, better understood as existential tools: not as the contexts where we can find 
completion and satisfaction, but rather as instruments that enable us to embrace ourselves and 
negotiate with various aspects of our (individual as well as collective) existence in previously-
unexperienced guises.  
 
It is in relation to this standpoint that I claim that human beings cannot be existentially 
„completed‟ by technological means. In the proposed perspective, this is not simply a problem 
with the current technologies or our mastery of them: we are constitutively bound to 
dissatisfaction, and driven to constantly explore and experiment with new worlds and unfamiliar 
possibilities of being. Virtual worlds, in their peculiar ways, arguably offer those experiences and 
possibilities, and in doing so, they contribute to our existential struggle both in allowing us to 
transcend some aspects of our everyday relationship with the actual world, and in disclosing new 
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